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We calculate the present value of state pension liabilities under existing policies, and separately under
policy changes that would affect pension payouts including cost of living adjustments (COLAs), retirement
ages, and buyout schedules for early retirement. Liabilities if plans were frozen as of June 2009 would
be $3.2 trillion if capitalized using taxable municipal curves, which credit states for a possibility of
default in the same states of the world as general obligation debt, and $4.4 trillion using the Treasury
curve. Under the typical actuarial method of recognizing future service and wage increases, liabilities
are $3.6 trillion and $5.2 trillion using municipal curves and Treasury curves respectively. Compared
to $1.8 trillion in pension fund assets, the baseline level of unfunded liabilities is therefore around
$3 trillion under Treasury rates. A one percentage point reduction in COLAs would reduce total liabilities
by 9￿-11%, implementing actuarially fair early retirement could reduce them by 2￿-5%, and raising the
retirement age by one year would reduce them by 2￿-4%. Even relatively dramatic policy changes, such
as the elimination of COLAs or the implementation of Social Security retirement age parameters, would
leave liabilities around $1.5 trillion more than plan assets under Treasury discounting. This suggests
that taxpayers will bear the lion's share of the costs associated with the legacy liabilities of state DB
pension plans.
Joshua Rauh
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1 The proposals outlined in GASB (2010) would basically maintain this system, with muni rate discounting kicking 






























                                                 
2 The raw sum of CAFR liabilities regardless of the reporting date was $3.03 trillion. Using the weighted-average 
growth rate of the reported plans to extrapolate for missing data and harmonizing all plans to a June reporting date 
yielded a total June 2009 liability of $3.14 trillion on a stated basis. See Internet Appendix Table I of Novy-Marx 




























                                                 
3 To be precise, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2008) found that the present value of the possibility that pensions could end 
up overfunded, if there assets' performance greatly exceeds their expected returns, is only worth $16 billion today. 
The surplus would only come  in low marginal utility states of the world. This means that even if the government is 
unlikely to squander any overfunding (or promise it to beneficiaries as in Bodie (1990)), the value of that possible 




























































                                                 
4 For example, a 6% buyout rate is very actuarially generous under stated or muni rates, but it is closer to actuarially 

























                                                 
5 Anecdotally, at least some unions and public officials seem to understand that taxpayers are bankrolling generous 
retirement plans. For example, a Minnesota executive director of a public employee union has been quoted in the 
Wall Street Journal as saying that his board was accepting COLA reductions for current retirees so that “we don't 
kill the goose that lays that golden egg” (Neumann (2010)). 
6 Specifically, we allow early retirement as early as age 62, but use a linear buyout schedule with a buyout rate six 
percent higher than the COLA rate employed by each plan. Social Security uses a non-linear buyout schedule that is 
roughly six percent per year, but unlike the state plans has COLAs, tied to wage growth, that apply prior to the date 
one begins receiving benefits. On this dimension Social Security is more generous than the state plans, and the fact 
that the unions do not seem particularly interested in fighting for COLAs that apply prior to the date of the first 
benefit payment suggests that they do not well represent plan participants, either current or future, that are separated 
and vested but not receiving benefits.  
7 “The General Assembly is desirous of providing an established annual cost-of-living adjustment to all current 
active and retired members of the Employees' Retirement System of Georgia, the Georgia Legislative Retirement 
System, and the Georgia Judicial Retirement System. In order to do so, limiting future liability of the systems by 
adjusting the retirement expectations of persons who are newly employed is a regrettable but necessary step toward 
fiscal soundness.” (Georgia House Bill 452/ Act 82). The bill passed the House March 9, 2009 (157-0), passed the 






























                                                 
































                                                 
9 This benefit reduction schedule is common practice in state public pension systems, and if anything conservative; 
the Florida Retirement System uses a 5% reduction for each year below the full retirement age, while the New 





















































































































































Active Annuitants Vested Total  Share
Summary Statistics 
Total  12,920,361 6,813,294 2,592,462 22,326,118  58%
Mean  111,382 58,735 22,349 192,466  55%
Median  61,240 35,678 6,144 103,483  58%
Std Dev  153,683 77,012 44,838 259,096  16%
Largest 10 Plans 
CalPERS  821,113 492,513 313,284 1,626,910  50%
Texas Teachers  946,405 283,018 59,622 1,289,045  73%
Florida Retirement System  668,416 321,137 87,284 1,076,837  62%
New York Employees  530,081 339,122 54,426 923,629  57%
CalSTRS  461,579 228,969 31,179 721,727  64%
Ohio Public Employees  360,186 169,333 123,673 653,191  55%
North Carolina (Teachers & State)  325,689 153,929 96,435 576,052  57%
Wisconsin Retirement System  265,779 146,484 149,258 561,521  47%































































ABO  $2.76   $3.20  $4.43    $3.20  $4.43  
PBO  $3.07   $3.53  $5.11  $3.41  $4.86  
EAN  $3.15   $3.62  $5.28  $3.49  $5.01  
PVB  $3.75   $4.24  $6.86    $4.04  $6.36  
Active Participants 
ABO  $1.09   $1.23  $1.94    $1.23  $1.94  
PBO  $1.40   $1.56  $2.62  $1.45  $2.37  
EAN  $1.48   $1.65  $2.80  $1.53  $2.52  
PVB  $2.08   $2.27  $4.37    $2.07  $3.87  
Annuitants  $1.58   $1.87  $2.28    $1.87  $2.28  












































ABO  $3.20   $2.92  $3.08  $3.12   $2.49 
PBO  $3.53   $3.22  $3.38  $3.43   $2.75 
EAN  $3.62   $3.30  $3.46  $3.51   $2.82 
PVB  $4.24   $3.86  $4.02  $4.09   $3.29 
Active Participants 
ABO  $1.23   $1.12  $1.13  $1.16   $0.96 
PBO  $1.56   $1.42  $1.43  $1.47   $1.21 
EAN  $1.65   $1.50  $1.52  $1.56   $1.28 
PVB  $2.27   $2.06  $2.08  $2.13   $1.76 
Annuitants  $1.87   $1.71  $1.87  $1.87   $1.47 




ABO  ‐8.7% ‐3.7% ‐2.6%  ‐22.1%
PBO  ‐8.7% ‐4.1% ‐2.9%  ‐22.1%
EAN  ‐8.7% ‐4.2% ‐3.0%  ‐22.1%
PVB  ‐8.9% ‐5.0% ‐3.5%  ‐22.3%
Active Participants 
ABO  ‐9.2% ‐8.1% ‐5.9%  ‐22.5%
PBO  ‐9.2% ‐8.2% ‐5.9%  ‐22.5%
EAN  ‐9.2% ‐8.2% ‐5.9%  ‐22.4%
PVB  ‐9.3% ‐8.6% ‐6.1%  ‐22.6%
Annuitants  ‐8.2% 0.0% 0.0%  ‐21.6%














ABO  $4.43   $3.96  $4.37  $4.31   $3.27 
PBO  $5.11   $4.56  $5.03  $4.95   $3.76 
EAN  $5.28   $4.71  $5.20  $5.12   $3.89 
PVB  $6.86   $6.10  $6.74  $6.61   $5.03 
Active Participants 
ABO  $1.94   $1.72  $1.89  $1.84   $1.41 
PBO  $2.62   $2.32  $2.56  $2.48   $1.91 
EAN  $2.80   $2.47  $2.73  $2.65   $2.04 
PVB  $4.37   $3.86  $4.27  $4.14   $3.17 
Annuitants  $2.28   $2.06  $2.28  $2.28   $1.72 




ABO  ‐10.6% ‐1.4% ‐2.7%  ‐26.2%
PBO  ‐10.8% ‐1.5% ‐3.0%  ‐26.4%
EAN  ‐10.8% ‐1.5% ‐3.1%  ‐26.4%
PVB  ‐11.0% ‐1.7% ‐3.7%  ‐26.7%
Active Participants 
ABO  ‐11.5% ‐2.6% ‐5.3%  ‐27.1%
PBO  ‐11.5% ‐2.5% ‐5.3%  ‐27.2%
EAN  ‐11.5% ‐2.5% ‐5.2%  ‐27.2%
PVB  ‐11.6% ‐2.4% ‐5.4%  ‐27.4%
Annuitants  ‐9.6% 0.0% 0.0%  ‐24.7%




















ABO  $3.20   $2.99  $2.64  $2.42   $2.50 
PBO  $3.53   $3.27  $2.83  $2.60   $2.66 
EAN  $3.62   $3.35  $2.89  $2.65   $2.71 
PVB  $4.24   $3.86  $3.24  $2.98   $2.99 
Active Participants 
ABO  $1.23   $1.05  $0.72  $0.67   $0.60 
PBO  $1.56   $1.33  $0.92  $0.85   $0.76 
EAN  $1.65   $1.41  $0.97  $0.90   $0.80 
PVB  $2.27   $1.92  $1.33  $1.22   $1.09 
Annuitants  $1.87   $1.87  $1.87  $1.71   $1.87 




ABO  ‐6.5% ‐17.5% ‐24.3%  ‐21.9%
PBO  ‐7.4% ‐19.8% ‐26.3%  ‐24.6%
EAN  ‐7.5% ‐20.2% ‐26.7%  ‐25.2%
PVB  ‐8.9% ‐23.5% ‐29.8%  ‐29.3%
Active Participants 
ABO  ‐14.9% ‐41.3% ‐45.9%  ‐51.6%
PBO  ‐15.0% ‐41.2% ‐45.9%  ‐51.6%
EAN  ‐14.9% ‐41.0% ‐45.7%  ‐51.3%
PVB  ‐15.4% ‐41.6% ‐46.3%  ‐52.0%
Annuitants  0.0% 0.0% ‐8.2%  0.0%






















ABO  $4.43   $4.24  $3.73  $3.37   $3.38 
PBO  $5.11   $4.86  $4.20  $3.79   $3.74 
EAN  $5.28   $5.03  $4.32  $3.90   $3.84 
PVB  $6.86   $6.47  $5.39  $4.87   $4.65 
Active Participants 
ABO  $1.94   $1.78  $1.32  $1.19   $1.01 
PBO  $2.62   $2.40  $1.79  $1.62   $1.37 
EAN  $2.80   $2.57  $1.91  $1.73   $1.47 
PVB  $4.37   $4.01  $2.99  $2.70   $2.28 
Annuitants  $2.28   $2.28  $2.28  $2.06   $2.28 




ABO  ‐4.3% ‐15.8% ‐23.9%  ‐23.6%
PBO  ‐4.8% ‐17.8% ‐25.8%  ‐26.7%
EAN  ‐4.8% ‐18.2% ‐26.1%  ‐27.3%
PVB  ‐5.7% ‐21.4% ‐29.0%  ‐32.1%
Active Participants 
ABO  ‐8.4% ‐31.9% ‐38.5%  ‐47.7%
PBO  ‐8.3% ‐31.7% ‐38.3%  ‐47.6%
EAN  ‐8.2% ‐31.5% ‐38.1%  ‐47.3%
PVB  ‐8.3% ‐31.7% ‐38.3%  ‐47.7%
Annuitants  0.0% 0.0% ‐9.6%  0.0%





































ABO PBO EAN PVB
baseline
COLA ‐ 1%
AFER
Retirement Age + 1 year
Eliminate COLA
$trillions